澳洲时政今日: 0|主题: 2216

澳洲时政版的宗旨是为了提高在澳华人对澳洲时政的了解和关心，最终达到提高澳洲华人参政热情和对澳洲政治的影响力。1. 内容仅限于澳洲时事和政坛相关的讨论。任何其他国家的内容将被删除，恕不另行通知。2. 新闻翻译请发到新闻版。3. 坚持对事不对人的原则。禁止任何人身攻击，谩骂，讥笑嘲讽，无中生有的发帖。欢迎举报任何违规内容。4. 鼓励对时事的不同看法和讨论。5. 鉴于本版内容可能会比较有争议性，版主会根据情况处理帖子。6. 本版不接受任何转帖。

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联邦选举投票指南最后跟贴：什么时候选，等不及了。最后发表：parramatta ...2	Y叔 2013-9-3	4517502	parramatta 2021-3-2 06:33
请大家记住选举委员会的网站: www.aec.gov.au 最后跟贴：一定去投票。最后发表：GEWEIYA ...2	bulaohu 2010-8-16	4222866	GEWEIYA 2021-3-1 08:23
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澳大利亚本国大台上面中国报道的立场和可信度最后跟贴：Only time will tell 最后发表：happyheros ...2	dayone 2021-2-17	572824	happyheros 2021-4-13 10:33
澳大利亚皇家海军供应号补给舰服役最后跟贴：好消息。最后发表：zhudi New	Z80CPU 2021-4-11	180	zhudi 2021-4-13 09:37
第二次Covid-19疫苗接种意愿调查（投票自动加2分）最后跟贴：打打打不然无法出国最后发表：雨泽善 ...2 3 4 5 6	Y叔 2021-3-2	16615380	雨泽善 2021-4-11 14:04
2021: 你支持女王之后，澳大利亚变成共和国吗？最后跟贴：不懂脱离英联邦后有什么优势和劣势，对于普通老百姓有什么现实生活上的感觉。假如脱离后公共假期少一天了，那就别脱离了。其他就不怎么在乎。最后发表：kyle1031 ...2	starau 2021-3-10	472435	kyle1031 2021-4-10 09:46
墨尔本华人杨怡生12只手机电脑遭扣押，检方彻查微信取得秘密录音！最后跟贴：澳华商涉外国干预案墨尔本医院退还其捐款\| 反外国干预法\| 反 ...https://www.epochtimes.com › ... 2021年3月3日 — 澳洲根据反外国干预法起诉的第一人——华商杨怡生（Di Sanh Duong）曾代表一华人组织向墨尔本医院（Royal Melbourne Hospital）捐款。最后发表：swe New	letbe 2021-4-8	17809	swe 2021-4-9 11:33
美国的这股Asian hate妖风会不会吹到澳洲来？最后跟贴： cchhxxii 发表于 2021-4-7 21:00 国内仇美仇澳都是键盘上的，真见着个老外都跟见着爹似的。。。。连黑人都吃香，一群女大学生往上贴，国家 ... 那是你自己内心的想法。最后发表：rabbitpoint ...2	rado 2021-3-31	442273	rabbitpoint 2021-4-8 08:58
WestConnex：吞噬悉尼的收费公路最后跟贴： pigtail 发表于 2021-4-7 21:55 不要脸的政府 M5机场那段明明没有任何升级却要收费不收费，挤到M5，M8白修了最后发表：月亮粑粑	幸运儿 2021-3-28	19847	月亮粑粑 2021-4-7 23:02
最新：阿德莱德打人的Funtea奶茶店重新开业了！最后跟贴：最后发表：happyheros ...2	yybsn 2021-3-3	362631	happyheros 2021-4-2 18:38
我来谈谈墨尔本张菊失踪案的疑点和个人见解最后跟贴：怎么这么久都没找到人或者尸体民间组织能自发去寻找吗这个马来男的亲友同事会不会有知情的真希望匿名电话多打几次帮助警方早日破案最后发表：菩萨蛮 ...2	Wuailing 2021-2-10	444226	菩萨蛮 2021-4-1 21:56
奶茶店老板最新发言：害我的这些孙子，走着瞧最后跟贴：渔人发表于 2021-3-10 01:05 悉尼奶爸帮忙洗白，功不可没怎么回事？最后发表：nis6 ...2 3 4	yybsn 2021-2-14	10311134	nis6 2021-3-30 14:26
腐败在澳大利亚非常普遍-是时候制止腐败了最后跟贴： CopyLeft 发表于 2021-3-25 13:42 虽然算不上完美，也比排在清廉榜后面的上百个国家强。而澳洲这样清廉的国家还在不停的反思自身的清廉问题， ... 100步肯定没资格笑50步，反之。最后发表：一定要mark	简单. 2021-3-18	241048	一定要mark 2021-3-28 17:51
澳洲大麦价格回升最后跟贴：没有人翻译这个吗？大麦出口第二新高 https://www.farmweekly.com.au/story/7180464/australian-barley-is-in-demand/ 最后发表：vamoiz ...2	zzz 2020-11-3	422869	vamoiz 2021-3-27 17:10
澳大利亚议会阻止将中国在新疆所作所为定性为种族灭绝动议的表决最后跟贴：很好，议会里大部分议员脑子还是清楚的最后发表：bombhuauto	xxssww 2021-3-16	2570	bombhuauto 2021-3-25 15:21
重演的历史：1881年悉尼的天花和禁止“大洋号”进悉尼港的21天，失控的疫情和背锅的华人最后跟贴：近代华人移民史就是血泪史。最后发表：zhudi ...2	dam 2020-4-9	492639	zhudi 2021-3-25 11:04
来投票，你赞同同性婚姻合法化吗？（投票加3分）最后跟贴：不反对也不支持最后发表：young126 ...2 3 4 5 6..49	astina 2017-8-10	145964682	young126 2021-3-25 09:09
司法部长波特否认所指称强奸后，是否还应该继续担任内阁部长？（投票加一分）最后跟贴：2 最后发表：young126 ...2 3 4 5	astina 2021-3-4	12412763	young126 2021-3-25 09:05
刚刚微信上不去，一直“收取中“，”连接中“ 最后跟贴：这几天微信 QQ都不稳定最后发表：forceback	romabug 2021-3-24	3399	forceback 2021-3-25 08:41
谢连斌案上诉前疑点讨论最后跟贴： SoftSome 发表于 2021-2-22 18:19 几次审判的律师都没做最关键的一件事，包括前面的大牌律师。控方用大笔公款请了Perlin 博士这样的知名人 ... 这个拒绝采用的理由是“not fresh”？不fresh你怕啥？不就是因为fresh，会推翻控方专家的证词才被拒绝的的嘛！最后发表：SoftSome ...2 3 4 5 6..16	猫儿不笨 2019-1-20	46027340	SoftSome 2021-3-24 21:33
新版排华法案有望通过，该党已尝试投票废除18C！！！最后跟贴： meljohn 发表于 2021-3-14 10:35 ** 作者被禁止或删除内容自动屏蔽 ** 笑死了，一个针对肤色还能这么洗。以后你老了，看看美国亚裔老人的境遇。最后发表：dam ...2 3 4 5 6..13	dam 2019-4-28	37920344	dam 2021-3-23 16:57
澳洲现在没有足够疫苗可用，普通人注射疫苗，恐怕要等到年底，或者明年。最后跟贴：西安吃货发表于 2021-3-14 10:55 楼主是长安雪梨，发帖目的不是讲故事，而是搞诈骗 +1 是不是搞诈骗不知道，但是没有常识，没有根据胡说八道是证据确凿，所以该封！最后发表：Acu	好奇号火星车 2021-3-13	18776	Acu 2021-3-22 07:28
拜登拒绝共享疫苗后，墨西哥向中国靠拢最后跟贴：最后发表：happyheros	xxssww 2021-3-17	2298	happyheros 2021-3-18 15:08
你愿意打Covid-19疫苗吗？（投票加2分）最后跟贴：打莫总一样的。最后发表：gagaet ...2 3 4 5 6..8	astina 2021-1-18	22316723	gagaet 2021-3-16 18:51
论"西澳和昆州一点点风吹草动就只知道关边境，就是懒政和无能的表现" 最后跟贴：主要这俩州有矿最后发表：好奇号火星车	Clojure 2021-3-13	1280	好奇号火星车 2021-3-14 08:12
AFR：以澳洲民主自由应对习近平的专制主义最后跟贴： nickzhang111 发表于 2021-3-12 17:48 澳洲经济上和中国牵连太深，，很难做到加拿大那样可以不屌中国，，但政治上也没有必要草木皆兵的惧怕中国， ... 只要允许渗透，什么都是可能的。然后就是套用郭文贵的话，一切才刚刚开始。看看美国这次大选乱不乱？最后发表：CopyLeft	CopyLeft 2021-3-10	6322	CopyLeft 2021-3-12 19:12
澳专家：中共以种族主义攻击澳洲制造混乱最后跟贴：好奇号火星车发表于 2021-3-11 18:17 他们从来不关心澳洲，切实存在的种族主义问题。 “ 但中共会用一种“混淆问题”的外交手法来模糊公众的认识，将公众的注意力从中共的问题上转移到对中共发出批评声音的源头上。” 最后发表：CopyLeft	CopyLeft 2021-3-8	5464	CopyLeft 2021-3-12 00:37
新冠疫情和中澳关系夹击：去年近两成在澳大利亚华裔遭威胁或攻击最后跟贴：胡扯，一群唯恐天下不乱的东西最后发表：Jianlin	gordenleevi 2021-3-10	1174	Jianlin 2021-3-10 19:46
加速主义最后跟贴：从历史唯物主义和历史辩证法的角度审视加速主义，有助于我们认清这一思潮的局限，从而捍卫马克思主义的科学性。最后发表：jienigui	jienigui 2021-3-9	0176	jienigui 2021-3-9 17:43
阿贝兹再抛言论，号召澳人团结抗共最后跟贴： sangchen 发表于 2020-12-25 17:24 从小一块长大的朋友就是行刑枪手，开枪只击头部多是为了器官移植，医院的车就等在边上。 ... 枪毙时枪击头部是起码的人道，用绞刑架也一样得研究下坠高度和绳结以期有效脊髓离断让受刑人少遭受痛苦。取器官的做法又是另一回事。最后发表：ItsThere ...2 3 4 5 6	iphone1000 2020-12-24	1676892	ItsThere 2021-3-9 10:55
澳华裔议员收到种族歧视信件最后跟贴：这封信里没有说你是不是共产党之类的，只说了黄皮肤，华人（包括港台吗？）这算是自由言论的一种吗？有人可以解答一下吗？但是信里面表现的好像很无望。最后发表：幸福的准妈妈 ...2	she1004 2021-3-3	582278	幸福的准妈妈 2021-3-9 01:01
中国政府是目标是让莫里森下台最后跟贴：澳洲应该加强与东盟，台湾的关系，，，最后发表：nickzhang111 ...2 3 4 5 6	outdance 2020-11-29	15410078	nickzhang111 2021-3-8 19:09
拜登和中美中澳关系最后跟贴：制度、意识形态以及竞争，构成了复杂的关系。最后发表：GEWEIYA	dayone 2021-2-13	10493	GEWEIYA 2021-3-6 19:10
布里斯班太晒了，有什么防黑秘籍么。最后跟贴：控制时间，不要长时间暴晒，再擦点防晒霜，。最后发表：GEWEIYA	wheniyoung 2021-2-16	8494	GEWEIYA 2021-3-4 20:08
论司法总长对强奸指控的自辩最后跟贴：今天司法总长Christian Porter站出来，承认自己就是媒体中被指控在30年前强奸16岁少女的当事人。司法总长和一些右翼记者（如Andrew Bolt）把此事与前任工党领袖Bill Shorten的经历拿出来作对比，以证明自己受到了媒体的不公正对待。 Bill Shorten被指控在30多年前性侵一位女士，该女子在2014年Bill Shorten当选反对党（工党）领袖之后，在自己的facebook上声称在80年代曾经被Shorten强奸。此事刚出时，Shorten也没有对公众发声，他等到警方结案并不宣布证据不足、不予起诉之后，对媒体交代说自己就是性侵指控的对象，觉得自己有必要在事件结束后给大家一个交代，以证清白。此事在Shorten 对外公开说明之后告一段落，后来Shorten在2019年的联邦大选中失败，输给了自由党的Scomo,因此辞去工党领袖职位。Shorten在大选中的失败原因很多，但是曾经的性侵指控却并不是主要原因，因为他早在2014年就已洗脱罪名,并继续担任工党领袖。今天，自由党政府的司法总长Christian Porter被迫承认自己就是30多年前一起少女强奸案的被指控者，他拿出了Bill Shorten的例子来对比自己的遭遇，认为媒体并没有以同样宽容的态度来报道他，尽管他和Bill Shorten的遭遇十分相似。乍一听，Porter的辩解似乎很有说服力：的确，他迟迟不站出来，好像也是因为在等待警方的最终结论。而媒体却有意无意地把此事渲染成了“他做贼心虚所以迟迟不敢承认”的意思，媒体中还有许多报道都对已过世的女受害者持同情的态度，以此显得Porter有罪的形象跃然纸上。与Shorten对比，媒体似乎确实有区别对待的嫌疑。 Porter还公开表示，反对就此事进行独立调查。他的理由是，每个人除非被法庭认定为罪名成立，否则都是无辜的（presumption of innocence unless proven guilty)。假如一位高层政客仅仅因为遭到指控就要引咎辞职并且接受调查，那么先例一出，以后谁想打击自己的政治对手，都可以使出这个招数，这样民主制度就会受到挑战。嗯，不亏是搞法律的，Porter的这个论点似乎也很有说服力。那么我们看看，他的论点到底能不能站得住脚呢？先和Bill Shorten对比。大家可以思考以下的问题：（1）反对党领袖对司法公正的影响力大，还是在任司法总长对司法公正的影响力大？（2）Bill Shorten事件的原告也自杀身亡了吗？（3）Bill Shorten事件的原告有厚厚的日记本记录吗？有朋友旁证吗？（4）Bill Shorten 事件在警方宣布证据不足、不予起诉之后，其原告是否提出过异议？是否表示要追诉到底？是否表现出自杀倾向？（5）假如Porter事件的原告仍然在世，警方还能够如此快速的结案吗？如此看来，针对Shorten的结案调查是否比针对Porter的结案调查需要更多的取证，也因此更有说服力呢？再分析一下司法总长的第二个论点，即：如果随便一个政客仅仅因为被指控就要面临独立调查并停职，这会坏了民主的规矩。那么我们再把总长与”随便一个政客“进行比较：（1）”随便一个政客“成为司法总长的几率有多大？（2）”随便一个政客“在遭到性侵指控后，受害人因为此事自杀身亡的几率有多大？假如对以上两种情况的几率都很低的话，那么总长大人口中说的“开了先例”是否还能成立？试问，出现能参照此等先例的案子的可能性有多大呢？大家对此事议论纷纷，其实Porter在此事中之所以获得媒体的宽容程度不高，而他之所以获得公众的怀疑程度很高，就是因为他所涉及的事情与一般的政客性丑闻都没有可比性，可以说是挑战了大众的容忍程度。而Scomo在这样的情况下，依然希望能够活活稀泥、不了了之，只能说明他的道德标准连普通大众都不如。大家想想，是不是这么回事儿？最后发表：克鲁伊	克鲁伊 2021-3-3	0205	克鲁伊 2021-3-3 19:25
最新：候议员：商家是弱势群体奶茶店主说受到死亡威胁，悉尼奶爸收费采访，唐人街商家联名写信赞扬候议员最后跟贴：啥情况呀，谁是工厂主的儿子呀？最后发表：凯蒂猫 ...2 3 4 5 6	yybsn 2021-2-10	1568860	凯蒂猫 2021-3-2 18:36
关于奶茶事件的访谈视频，悉尼奶爸的节奏最后跟贴：吃相有点难看了最后发表：凯蒂猫 ...2 3 4 5 6	PotatoChips 2021-2-10	1598230	凯蒂猫 2021-3-2 18:26
请愿！！要求侯议员辞职！！！最后跟贴：为啥就没有像模像样的一点的人来当议员呢最后发表：凯蒂猫 ...2 3 4	8gua 2021-2-10	1084910	凯蒂猫 2021-3-2 18:23
足迹赞不绝口的安州长吹牛后在牛年被打脸 (附所有英文链接) 最后跟贴：看他的长相憨憨厚厚的挺可爱的最后发表：凯蒂猫 ...2	yang689 2021-2-12	311517	凯蒂猫 2021-3-2 18:20
‘The Longer Telegram’ Is A Recipe For Costly Failure 最后跟贴： https://www.theamericanconservative.com/state-of-the-union/the-longer-telegram-is-a-recipe-for-costly-failure/ anonymous former government official has written a conventionally hawkish paper on China. The Atlantic Council and Politico have both published versions of the piece, and they have agreed to keep the author’s identity under wraps for reasons known only to them. The Atlantic Council claims that anonymity was necessary because of “the extraordinary significance of the author’s insights and recommendations.” It’s not clear why they find these insights and recommendations to be so extraordinary, since almost everything in the paper has been said before by various authors. It makes no sense why the author would need to remain anonymous in order to make these views known. The author likens the paper to George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” by calling it “the longer telegram,” but the paper has little or none of Kennan’s astute observations about history and strategy. A lot of it is a series of regurgitated ideological claims about the Chinese government and its ambitions under the leadership of Xi Jinping. In that respect, it is not so different from H.R. McMaster’s attempt from last year. It is just much, much longer. It may come as a surprise to learn that “Xi has returned China to classical Marxism-Leninism,” but this is what the executive summary of the report says. That is a bizarre and incorrect claim, but it is one that the anonymous author returns to several times. The author asserts that “Xi has demonstrated that he intends to project China’s authoritarian system, coercive foreign policy, and military presence well beyond his country’s own borders to the world at large,” but we are left wondering how this has been demonstrated and he never proves his case. Then the author oversimplifies things quite a bit when he says, “China under Xi, unlike under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, is no longer a status quo power. It has become a revisionist power.” Even granting that China has become somewhat more combative over certain territorial claims in the last nine years, this overstates the case. China can sometimes behave like a revisionist power, but in many ways China benefits from the existing institutions and rules and doesn’t wish to overturn them. It is inaccurate to describe China as being simply revisionist, and it creates a very misleading picture of China’s strategic goals. In short, the anonymous author exaggerates Chinese ambitions and threats as many China hawks tend to do, and he casts the rivalry between the U.S. and China in stark ideological terms that do not reflect reality. One unique element in the essay is the author’s proposal that the U.S. focus its attention on Xi and the party elite: Given the reality that today’s China is a state in which Xi has centralized nearly all decision-making power in his own hands, and used that power to substantially alter China’s political, economic, and foreign-policy trajectory, US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual. Right here we can see the critical flaw in the author’s proposed strategy that renders the rest of the essay rather redundant. He imagines that there is some way that the U.S. can successfully change the decision-making of top Chinese officials when our government’s record of compelling foreign leaders to change their behavior is very poor. The U.S. has tried and failed to force changes in regime behavior in much smaller, weaker countries than China. The idea that the U.S. has the ability to force such changes in the Chinese government’s behavior is sheer fantasy. If the U.S. is supposed to change Chinese officials’ decision-making, what does the author want to achieve? The author says that the “overriding political objective should be to cause China’s elite leadership to collectively conclude that it is in the country’s best interests to continue to operate within the existing US-led liberal international order rather than build a rival order,” but pressure tactics are likely to encourage China to build more parallel institutions as a way of adapting to pressure. The author wants to convince Beijing “that it is in the party’s best interests, if it wishes to remain in power at home, not to attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.” In addition to being a reckless threat of attempting regime change if they do not comply with U.S. wishes, this is a solution to a problem that largely doesn’t exist. Chinese territorial ambitions are limited, and its government has no desire to export its political model anywhere outside its own territory. Like Pompeo and McMaster, the anonymous author assumes that China has ideologically-driven expansionist goals that encompass the globe. He is on guard against a phantom menace. Home/The State Of The Union/‘The Longer Telegram’ Is A Recipe For Costly Failure ‘The Longer Telegram’ Is A Recipe For Costly Failure bibiphoto / Shutterstock.com JANUARY 29, 2021\|3:56 PM DANIEL LARISON An anonymous former government official has written a conventionally hawkish paper on China. The Atlantic Council and Politico have both published versions of the piece, and they have agreed to keep the author’s identity under wraps for reasons known only to them. The Atlantic Council claims that anonymity was necessary because of “the extraordinary significance of the author’s insights and recommendations.” It’s not clear why they find these insights and recommendations to be so extraordinary, since almost everything in the paper has been said before by various authors. It makes no sense why the author would need to remain anonymous in order to make these views known. The author likens the paper to George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” by calling it “the longer telegram,” but the paper has little or none of Kennan’s astute observations about history and strategy. A lot of it is a series of regurgitated ideological claims about the Chinese government and its ambitions under the leadership of Xi Jinping. In that respect, it is not so different from H.R. McMaster’s attempt from last year. It is just much, much longer. It may come as a surprise to learn that “Xi has returned China to classical Marxism-Leninism,” but this is what the executive summary of the report says. That is a bizarre and incorrect claim, but it is one that the anonymous author returns to several times. The author asserts that “Xi has demonstrated that he intends to project China’s authoritarian system, coercive foreign policy, and military presence well beyond his country’s own borders to the world at large,” but we are left wondering how this has been demonstrated and he never proves his case. Then the author oversimplifies things quite a bit when he says, “China under Xi, unlike under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, is no longer a status quo power. It has become a revisionist power.” Even granting that China has become somewhat more combative over certain territorial claims in the last nine years, this overstates the case. China can sometimes behave like a revisionist power, but in many ways China benefits from the existing institutions and rules and doesn’t wish to overturn them. It is inaccurate to describe China as being simply revisionist, and it creates a very misleading picture of China’s strategic goals. In short, the anonymous author exaggerates Chinese ambitions and threats as many China hawks tend to do, and he casts the rivalry between the U.S. and China in stark ideological terms that do not reflect reality. One unique element in the essay is the author’s proposal that the U.S. focus its attention on Xi and the party elite: Given the reality that today’s China is a state in which Xi has centralized nearly all decision-making power in his own hands, and used that power to substantially alter China’s political, economic, and foreign-policy trajectory, US strategy must remain laser focused on Xi, his inner circle, and the Chinese political context in which they rule. Changing their decision-making will require understanding, operating within, and changing their political and strategic paradigm. All US policy aimed at altering China’s behavior should revolve around this fact, or it is likely to prove ineffectual. Right here we can see the critical flaw in the author’s proposed strategy that renders the rest of the essay rather redundant. He imagines that there is some way that the U.S. can successfully change the decision-making of top Chinese officials when our government’s record of compelling foreign leaders to change their behavior is very poor. The U.S. has tried and failed to force changes in regime behavior in much smaller, weaker countries than China. The idea that the U.S. has the ability to force such changes in the Chinese government’s behavior is sheer fantasy. If the U.S. is supposed to change Chinese officials’ decision-making, what does the author want to achieve? The author says that the “overriding political objective should be to cause China’s elite leadership to collectively conclude that it is in the country’s best interests to continue to operate within the existing US-led liberal international order rather than build a rival order,” but pressure tactics are likely to encourage China to build more parallel institutions as a way of adapting to pressure. The author wants to convince Beijing “that it is in the party’s best interests, if it wishes to remain in power at home, not to attempt to expand China’s borders or export its political model beyond China’s shores.” In addition to being a reckless threat of attempting regime change if they do not comply with U.S. wishes, this is a solution to a problem that largely doesn’t exist. Chinese territorial ambitions are limited, and its government has no desire to export its political model anywhere outside its own territory. Like Pompeo and McMaster, the anonymous author assumes that China has ideologically-driven expansionist goals that encompass the globe. He is on guard against a phantom menace. The paper embeds the author’s misguided China recommendations in a defense of continued U.S. global primacy. There are all the usual salutes to the virtues of U.S. “leadership” that we have come to expect from such arguments: “US leadership remains the only credible foundation for sustaining, enhancing, and, where necessary, creatively reinventing the liberal international order.” The paper declares that America’s “core objective must be the retention of US global and regional strategic primacy for the century ahead.” This mistakenly assumes that it is both possible and desirable to sustain U.S. primacy in the world and in East Asia. The truth is that the U.S. has to adapt to a world in which it does not dominate East Asia or the world. The author’s unwillingness to contemplate the reality that it already upon us confirms that he is more ideologue than careful strategist. The author warns, “To abandon this mission would mean “the city upon a hill” would fade from view as the United States became just another nation-state in narrow pursuit of its national self-interest.” This is unvarnished American exceptionalist hogwash. The idea that America might become a normal country that pursues its own interests horrifies the author. All of the threat inflation and exaggerations of Chinese ambitions serve the purpose of giving America another grand ideological quest so that it doesn’t become “just another nation-state,” but the pursuit of yet another open-ended crusade has nothing to do with U.S. security and prosperity and it will undermine and possibly even wreck both. The so-called “longer telegram” is a recipe for costly failure, and it should be dismissed as such. There is a better U.S. strategy for East Asia available, and it looks nothing like this. 最后发表：joannejonesn	joannejonesn 2021-3-1	0110	joannejonesn 2021-3-1 16:24

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